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TECHNICAL FOULS: ADJUDICATING 
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS WITH 
EQUITABLE RESOLUTIONS 
ANTONIO G. FRAONE* 
Abstract: In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the United States Supreme Court 
allowed for an equitable resolution to a lawsuit seeking immediate enforcement, 
by injunction, of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”). In this 
case, the United States Navy violated the FWPCA by discharging munitions—a 
pollutant as defined by the statute—during training exercises into the waters 
surrounding the Island of Vieques. The Navy also failed to obtain a National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit, which would have made the 
discharge lawful under the statute. The people of Puerto Rico sought to enjoin 
the training exercises through the FWPCA. The Navy’s actions, however, had 
no adverse effects on the area’s waters or the environment. Thus, the Court 
viewed the violation as only technical and allowed for an equitable resolution to 
an otherwise valid violation of a statute. This Comment argues that the Supreme 
Court’s holding was correct in allowing an equitable resolution to a technical 
violation of a statute. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 15, 1898 the USS Maine suffered from an internal explo-
sion while docked in Havana Harbor.1 At that time Spain controlled all of 
Cuba, as it had since Christopher Columbus claimed the land.2 Prior to the 
destruction of the vessel, the United States and Spain faced growing tensions 
over the rule of Cuba because the island sought independence.3 With the USS 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 John M. Dobson, Spanish-Cuban/American War, in THE WAR OF 1898 AND U.S. INTER-
VENTIONS 1898–1934: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 520, 521 (Benjamin R. Beede ed., 1994). A naval team 
investigating the incident attributed the destruction to an external explosive device placed on the 
ship by the Spanish. Id. at 521–22. A modern analysis of the explosion has cast doubt on this orig-
inal theory and instead places fault for the explosion on the spontaneous combustion of improperly 
stored coal. Id. at 521. The situation was exacerbated by the nearby placement of shells and gun-
powder. Id. 
 2 RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY 13, 39 (2005). 
 3 Dobson, supra note 1, at 520–21. Public sentiment in the United States formed for rebels in 
Cuba fighting for independence. Id. Cubans involved in the cause also migrated to the United 
States and bolstered anti-Spanish opinions. Id. American newspapers fueled the movement as well 
by publishing exaggerated reports of human rights atrocities and labeled the Cuban governor a 
“butcher.” Id. at 521. American newspapers published an intercepted letter from a high-ranking 
Spanish diplomat that called the President of the United States, William McKinley “weak” and a 
“would-be politician” angering the American public. Id. Cuban independence also coincided with 
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Maine on the ocean floor, tensions rose to an all-time high and American 
newspapers fueled growing public resentment for Spain.4 Soon after, on April 
20, 1898, the United States sent an ultimatum to Spain calling for Cuban in-
dependence.5 The Spanish government responded two days later by severing 
diplomatic ties with the United States, which led to the United States Navy 
(“Navy”) initiating a blockade of Cuba.6 Spain retaliated by declaring war on 
April 23, to which the United States responded with its own declaration of 
war on April 25, beginning the Spanish-American War.7 After 116 days, the 
war ended with a victory for the United States.8 To conclude the conflict, the 
two nations signed the Treaty of Paris of 1898.9 This also led to Cuban inde-
pendence and the United States’ acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines.10 
As a result of the war, Puerto Rico became a territory of the United 
States.11 Vieques, an island and civilian municipality located approximately 
six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico, was included in the acqui-
sition.12 Vieques is approximately twenty miles long, four and a half miles 
wide at its widest point, and consists of about 33,000 acres of land.13 The to-
tal population of Vieques fluctuates—in 1970 the population of the island was 
estimated to be between 6,000 and 12,000 people.14 
Between 1939 and 1944, the Navy purchased 26,000 of the 33,000 total 
acres of Vieques.15 Since this acquisition, the Navy has used the land for a 
wide range of training exercises, which have become more extensive with the 
advancement of military technology.16 Overall, this naval property is part of a 
larger military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training 
                                                                                                                           
United States’ interests by growing the nation’s influence and potentially expanding its borders. 
Id. at 521–23. 
 4 Id. at 521. 
 5 DAVID F. TRASK, THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898, at 56 (1996). 
 6 Id. at 57. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 435 (noting that the conflict ended on August 12, 1989). 
 9 Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Spain-
U.S., art. XVII, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris of 1898]; Balzac v. Porto 
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). 
 10 Treaty of Paris of 1898, supra note 9, at arts. I–III; Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 
654 (D.P.R. 1979); Trask, supra note 5, at 483. 
 11 Barcelo, 478 F.Supp. at 654. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 652. 
 14 Id. at 654 (“The population of Vieques according to the 1970 census, was 7,767 persons of 
which 2,378 lived in Isabel Segunda and 620 in Esperanza, the Island’s two towns, and 4,769 were 
classified as rural inhabitants.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. at 654–61. 
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Range.17 Here, the exercises consist of anti-aircraft gunnery exercises, missile 
exercises, and other combat exercises and training simulations.18 These exer-
cises involve various weapons, aircrafts, and Navy vessels, which fire both 
inert and live ordnance at various targets in varying positions on land and 
sea.19 
In Barcelo v. Brown, the people of Puerto Rico brought a lawsuit against 
the Navy to obtain an injunction, alleging numerous violations of environ-
mental laws.20 More specifically, the people of Puerto Rico alleged that the 
Navy violated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”) through 
the discharge of ordnance on targets located on the waters surrounding 
Vieques.21 The purpose of the FWPCA is to protect the integrity of the waters 
of the United States.22 The United States District Court for the District of 
Puerto Rico found that the Navy violated the FWPCA, but refused to issue an 
injunction, instead ordering the Navy to come into compliance with the law.23 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the 
District Court’s order, and remanded the case back to the trial court with or-
ders to issue an injunction to immediately cease the discharge of ordnance 
into the waters.24 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the First Circuit’s order, sending the case back to the District 
Court.25 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court correctly reversed the 
First Circuit and properly held a court of equity may use its traditional power 
of discretion when determining whether to order an injunction for a statue 
violation, but that power should only be allowed for technical violations.26 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 655. 
 18 Id. at 655–61. 
 19 Id. at 656. 
 20 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 307 n.1 (1982); Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 
651. The original complaint alleged that the United States Navy violated the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, the Noise Control Act of 1972, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, and the 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 651. The plaintiffs also 
alleged that the Navy violated the United States Constitution, executive and legislative directives, 
and various other laws of Puerto Rico. Id. 
 21 Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 306. 
 22 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 23 Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 309. 
 24 Id. at 310. 
 25 Id. at 311. 
 26 See infra notes 114–144 and accompanying text. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The United States Navy has conducted training exercises on Vieques 
since World War II.27 The island is part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Train-
ing Range, a military complex that is essential to the training and testing of 
the Atlantic Fleet.28 This military system consists of four ranges: the inner 
range, the outer range, an underwater tracking range, and an electronic war-
fare range.29 The inner range is located east of the Island of Vieques.30 The 
outer range, which is an ocean range, is located in the waters north, south, and 
east of Puerto Rico.31 The electronic range is located on St. Croix in the Vir-
gin Islands, which is east of Puerto Rico and Vieques.32 The Roosevelt Roads 
Naval Station in Cieba, Puerto Rico directs the operations and exercises that 
take place throughout these locations.33 
Numerous islanders, government officials, and organizations from Puer-
to Rico filed suit against the Navy in March 1978 for its activities within the 
inner range.34 This range consists of artillery, air-to-ground, and ship-to-shore 
targets located throughout the area.35 An observation post, located at Cerro 
Mateias, monitors and controls the activities that take place in the inner 
range.36 All training exercises are scheduled and notice is provided through 
widespread distribution and postings.37  
There are two targets contained in the inner range, designated as “Target 
1” and “Target 2.”38 There is also a strafing target and a stationary water tar-
get located in the area, and various other targets located elsewhere.39 The Na-
vy utilizes both inert and live ordnance during exercises that target these in-
stallations.40 By the end of 1971, all of these targets, with the exception of the 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 707. 
 28 Id. at 655. The Atlantic Fleet is global naval force that includes land, sea, and air forces that 
are deployed in an integrated and combined unit. Id. at 708. The fleet covers a great deal of territo-
ry from the Arctic to Antarctica and from Mexico to Turkey. Id.  
 29 Id. at 655. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 650–51. 
 35 Id. at 655. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 656. (stating that these targets are used for practice and that live ammunition is never 
used). “Target 1” is made of four concentric tire rings, fifty feet between each ring, with the larg-
est spanning 400 feet in diameter. Id. “Target 2” is similar to “Target 1” in design, but consists of 
only three rings with the largest measuring 300 feet. Id. The targets are separated by about two 
miles. Id. 
 39 Id. at 657. 
 40 Id. at 656–58. 
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water target, were active and operational.41 Some of these targets were in use 
prior to that date.42 All of these targets are used for combat and training exer-
cises.43 
These training activities gave rise to the plaintiffs’ claim that the Navy 
violated the FWPCA and should be enjoined from continuing any exercises.44 
In Barcelo v. Brown, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found 
that the Navy violated the statute because the bombings of targets resulted in 
the accidental and occasionally intentional falling of ordnance into the waters 
surrounding Vieques.45 The District Court also found that this situation re-
quired the Navy to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(“NPDES”) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
would allow the Navy to continue its activities.46 The District Court, howev-
er, refused to issue an injunction because it believed that a less prohibitive 
remedy was the best way for the court to utilize its equitable discretion in or-
der to resolve the situation.47 
In its refusal to issue an injunction, the court relied on the plaintiffs’ lack 
of evidence and the Navy’s motivation for the activities.48 First, the court 
found that the plaintiff presented no evidence that the falling ordnance and 
other materials that went into the water caused any measurable harm to the 
environment or affected the quality of the water itself.49 Further, the court 
considered the national security concern implicated by enjoining training ex-
ercises of such caliber and importance.50 Vieques is the only location that was 
available for the Atlantic Fleet to conduct such exercises and the only availa-
ble location that provided conditions that simulated combat.51 The Atlantic 
Fleet is of great importance to the United States and to the world because it 
provides naval support, protection, and monitoring on a global scale.52 Thus, 
the court concluded that preventing the Navy from keeping its training regi-
ments running accordingly would harm the strategic advantage that American 
naval forces have, potentially leading to national and international harm.53 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 657. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 656–657. 
 44 Id. at 651. 
 45 Id. at 663, 705, 708. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 706–07. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 663. 
 50 Id. at 707. 
 51 Id. at 708. 
 52 Id. (explaining the importance of the Atlantic Fleet). The Atlantic Fleet’s resources are 
limited due to the vast area it covers in its operations; therefore, it is imperative that the combined 
forces are at peak efficiency. Id. 
 53 See id. 
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Additionally, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ delay in filing their claim 
against the Navy: Congress passed the FWPCA more than six years prior to 
the filing of the complaint, and training operations were active before and 
during that period of time.54 Although laches did not bar the plaintiffs’ claim, 
the court weighed the time delay in the Navy’s favor.55 Due to these consider-
ations, the court ordered the Navy to come into compliance with the law and 
file for a NPDES permit to continue its operations lawfully.56 If the Navy 
failed to comply or if the permit was denied, then the court would issue an 
injunction.57 
On appeal in Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the 
case with instructions to issue an immediate injunction to stop the Navy from 
discharging ordnance into the waters surrounding Vieques.58 The First Circuit 
held that the Navy could resume its operations only after it obtained a 
NPDES permit from the EPA.59 The First Circuit believed that the FWPCA 
did not allow for the lower court to balance the equities as it had and stated 
instead that an injunction was the only proper remedy.60 The First Circuit also 
disregarded the fact that there was no evidence that the discharged ordnance 
caused environmental harm.61 The court believed that the statute clearly indi-
cated that the Navy’s actions amounted to a violation of the FWCPA, and that 
the statute should be enforced with an injunction regardless of the lack of 
proven harm to the waters of Vieques.62 The First Circuit also added that any 
national security concerns could be addressed through a presidential execu-
tive exemption to the Navy, as allowed by the statute.63 
The Navy appealed the First Circuit’s decision to the United States Su-
preme Court.64 The main issue of the case was whether the FWPCA required 
the District Court to issue an injunction and immediately enjoin the Navy’s 
operations once it determined that there was a violation.65 The Supreme Court 
disagreed with the First Circuit’s decision and reversed.66 The Court held that 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 707. 
 55 Id. Laches is an equitable doctrine that prevents a plaintiff from recovering on a claim 
brought after an unreasonable delay, which if allowed, would be unjust and prejudicial to the de-
fendant. Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 56 Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 708. 
 57 Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320. 
 58 Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861–63 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 59 Id. at 861–62. 
 60 See id. 
 61 Id. at 861. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 862. 
 64 See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 305, 311. 
 65 Id. at 306–07. 
 66 Id. at 307. 
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the equitable discretion of a court exists in all decisions unless that discretion 
is removed by statute or law.67 Through its interpretation of the FWPCA, the 
Supreme Court found that equitable discretion is allowed and that the stat-
ute’s organization and compliance scheme supports this finding.68 Continuing 
in its reasoning, the Court explained the long tradition of broad equitable dis-
cretion has been a part of the American legal system since its inception and 
should not be hindered or destroyed by automatic or mechanical results and 
rulings.69 As a result, the Court ruled that an injunction is not automatically 
issued for violations of the FWPCA and that balanced equitable orders can be 
issued by courts, when possible, in order to address competing interests.70 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”) 
to protect and restore the physical, chemical, and biological quality of the 
waters of the United States.71 Specifically, the statute makes it illegal for any 
person to discharge any pollutant.72 The FWPCA’s definition of a pollutant is 
wide and encompasses numerous categories and examples of qualifying sub-
stances and materials, such as munitions.73 The addition of any pollutants 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 313. 
 68 Id. at 316. 
 69 Id. at 311–13. 
 70 Id. On May 1, 2003, the United States Navy (“Navy”) ceased training operations and left 
the island. Frances Olsen, Civil Disobedience on Vieques: How Nonviolence Defeated the U.S. 
Military, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 547, 547 (2004). This departure occurred after a Navy aircraft acci-
dentally killed one local citizen and injured four others during a training exercise. Id. at 551–55. 
The accident sparked substantial protests, which obtained widespread support and directly led to 
the Navy leaving the site. Id. Although operations ceased, the land remains contaminated due to 
the training that occurred on the island. Id. at 558. In 2004, the Environmental Protection Agency 
deemed Vieques a superfund site. Maritza Stanchich, Ten Years After Ousting US Navy, Vieques 
Confronts Contamination, HUFF. POST: THE WORLD POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maritza-
stanchich-phd/ten-years-after-ousting-u_b_3243449.html [https://perma.cc/HXU2-8EG5]. A Su-
perfund site is a hazardous area that is harmful or potentially harmful to the public or the envi-
ronment that needs to be cleaned up and remedied. Superfund Cleanup Process, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 11, 2017) https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cleanup-process [https://
perma.cc/RET7-E7YV]. 
Decontamination and cleanup of the Vieques Superfund site was originally scheduled to be com-
pleted in 2020, but more recent projections say cleanup may proceed until 2029. Stanchich, supra.  
 71 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 72 Id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(5). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”) defines a 
person as “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” Id. § 1362(5). The FWPCA defines pollu-
tion as “man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiologi-
cal integrity of water.” Id. § 1362(19). 
 73 Id. § 1362(6). A pollutant under the FWPCA “means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator 
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radio-
active materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, mu-
nicipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. 
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from a point source into navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, or 
the ocean is considered to be discharging pollutants under the statutory 
framework.74 The FWPCA defines a point source as essentially anything 
from which pollutants can or may be discharged.75 
A party can lawfully discharge pollutants by obtaining a National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit from the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA).76 This permit system is instrumental to the goals 
of the statute.77 Through it, Congress limits the amount of pollutants dis-
charged into the nation’s waters by requiring any person who wishes to do so 
to seek prior approval from the EPA.78 
The NPDES scheme monitors discharge and controls the amount of pol-
lutants that reach the water.79 The permit system also functions to transform 
general effluent limitations and other environmental standards into obliga-
tions, which can include dates for compliance, for approved dischargers of 
any pollutants.80 Essentially, a permit effectuates the statute by facilitating 
compliance while also enforcing individual obligations to reach full compli-
ance.81 All federal agencies were called upon to lead the national effort to-
wards total compliance by every current and future discharger.82 
Courts have relied on the FWPCA’s plain and unambiguous language to 
determine which actions and conduct require a NPDES permit.83 In order to 
obtain a NPDES permit, entities first file a permit application with the EPA.84 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Id. § 1362(7)–(10), (12). Under the FWPCA, one discharges a pollutant when one adds 
“any pollutant to navigable waters . . . waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point 
source other than a vessel or other floating craft.” Id. § 1362(12). In this context, “navigable wa-
ters” are “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” and “territorial seas” are the 
waters within three miles of the United States’ coastline. Id. § 1362(7)–(8). The contiguous zone 
encompasses areas twelve miles from the baseline of a country’s territorial sea, as elaborated in 
the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Id. § 1362(9); Law of the 
Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The FWPCA defines “ocean” as the areas of the sea “beyond the contig-
uous zone.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(10). 
 75 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining point source). 
 76 See id. §§ 1323, 1342; Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 663 (D.P.R. 1979). 
 77 See Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 7 (1976). 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976). 
 81 Id. at 205. 
 82 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2012) (stating that all federal agencies must comply with federal, state, 
interstate, and local laws and regulations governing water pollution and quality control); Envtl. 
Prot. Agencyv. California, 426 U.S. at 205. 
 83 Train, 426 U.S. at 9; Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 625 
(8th Cir. 1979) (“The purpose of the Amendments was broad and remedial, with their stated ob-
jective being ‘[the] restor[ation] and main[tenance] [of] the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”) (alteration in original). 
 84 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1342 (2012); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 45 (5th ed. 2016). 
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If the EPA issues a permit, the applicant may proceed with operations that 
would otherwise violate the statute.85 States may also create their own permit 
process.86 If the EPA accepts a state’s process, thereby delegating permitting 
authority, then the state’s limitations and restrictions govern its permit pro-
cess.87 States are free to implement the process in any way they see fit, which 
can lead to stricter rules or a more relaxed policy, so long as the EPA ap-
proves the state’s process.88 
The President of the United States may exempt any agency, department, 
or executive branch organization from the FWPCA’s NPDES permit require-
ment.89 This power allows the President to excuse any discharging activities 
not in compliance with the statute.90 The interest of the country is the only 
requirement for the granting of this waiver.91 
If an entity violates this statute by discharging pollutants without a per-
mit, the most effective judicial option is to obtain an injunction to enjoin that 
activity.92 To attain an injunction, the complainant must show that there is no 
other remedy that can abate the current or potential injury faced.93 Essentially, 
the party seeking the court order has no other option to avoid the harm that 
sparked the lawsuit.94 
Injunctions are not automatically granted for every violation of the 
law.95 A judge has no duty to issue such an order in any and all circumstances 
where compliance is an issue.96 Further, a court should not order an injunc-
tion to prevent potentially harmful or harmful acts that will result in an injury 
that is insignificant or trivial.97 Thus, an injunction should be issued only in 
circumstances where the claimant’s injury is irremediable and can only be 
prevented by the court’s intervention.98 In cases involving statutory viola-
tions, injunctions are issued when the order is the only way to ensure compli-
ance.99 If a violator can come into compliance or at least move towards it, 
                                                                                                                           
 85 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1342; Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. at 205. 
 86 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1342; Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. at 206–08. 
 87 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1342; Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. at 206–08. 
 88 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1342; Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. at 206–08. 
 89 33 U.S.C. § 1323. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861–62 (1st Cir. 1981). Injunction is defined as 
“[a] court order commanding or preventing an action.” Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 93 Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919). 
 94 See id. at 456.  
 95 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978). 
 96 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. 
Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933). 
 97 Consol. Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U.S. 296, 302 (1900). 
 98 Cavanaugh, 248 U.S. at 456. 
 99 See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 193–94. 
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without presently disregarding the statute’s purpose, there is no need for an 
injunction unless it is the only viable option for the court to fully enforce the 
law.100 
Within disputes, plaintiffs and defendants have competing interests, 
which can require courts to use their equitable discretion to help the parties 
reach a compromise.101 Through its discretionary power, the court balances 
the interests of the parties while factoring the potential harm that may result 
from the granting or withholding of an injunction.102 Thus, courts can arrive 
at a balanced solution that accounts for the specific circumstances of a dis-
pute.103 
The parties’ interests, however, are not the court’s only focus.104 Rulings 
should also factor in the public’s interest and the effect that an injunction 
would have on third parties.105 The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that if an injunction will adversely affect the public, those interests may be 
taken into consideration even though a party to the lawsuit may be harmed.106 
Therefore, courts look further than the affected party in determining whether 
to grant an injunction or resolve a dispute more equitably.107 
Congress can also affect the equitable relief determination through statu-
tory language that leaves a court no option other than issuing an injunction 
for a violation of the statute.108 For that to occur the statute’s language must 
be clear and obvious or a court will freely rely on its discretionary powers.109 
An example of clear language is Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), which the Court analyzed in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.110 
The section requires federal agencies to protect any endangered species or its 
critical habitats from actions that would harm the species’ continued exist-
ence.111 In Tennessee Valley Authority, the particular language of Section 7 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. (discussing the Court’s decision in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 325–26, 329, 331, 
not to issue an injunction for a statutory violation). In Hecht Co., the United States Supreme Court 
did not issue an injunction for a statutory violation because an injunction would have been preju-
dicial to the violator, gone against the public’s interest, and have no effect on the defendant’s 
compliance. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 193–94; Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 325–26, 329, 331. 
 101 Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329. 
 102 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). 
 103 See Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329. 
 104 See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
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led the Court to determine that an injunction was the only remedy that it 
could provide, as Congress made it clear that endangered species must be 
protected and failing to issue the injunction would result in a disregard of the 
law and its purpose.112 The takeaway, therefore, is that a court’s determination 
from the clarity, or lack thereof, of a statute’s language is key to determining 
what remedies are appropriate and available.113 
III. ANALYSIS 
The United States Supreme Court’s reversal of the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ order, which enjoined United States Navy (“Navy”) operations for a 
technical violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”), 
was the proper result in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.114 The Court held that 
injunctions are not mechanically issued solutions to violations of the law.115 
Rather, the Court explained that injunctions are solutions to issues that require 
the prevention or end of activities that may cause irremediable harm.116 Thus, 
the Court favored the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s original 
remedy, which ordered the Navy to take the necessary steps to comply with 
the FWPCA.117 Overall, the Court protected the traditional equitable powers 
of a court, which allows for the court to determine a balanced solution to an 
issue that factors in both sides of the dispute and outside interests.118 
The major piece of this case was the fact that the Navy’s discharge of 
munitions violated the FWPCA.119 Further, this violation could have been 
avoided if the Navy obtained a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (“NPDES”) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).120 
While steps to FWPCA compliance are clear, another factor was that the Na-
vy’s discharge of munitions caused no adverse effects to the environment, the 
area’s waters, or wildlife.121 Essentially, the Navy’s violation was only “tech-
nical” in the sense that no harm beyond non-compliance was shown by the 
complainants.122 
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Although the Navy violated the FWPCA, the Supreme Court properly 
reversed the ordered injunction.123 Congress enacted the FWPCA to protect 
and restore the physical, chemical, and biological quality of the waters of the 
United States. 124 Through the statute, the legislature intended to prevent open 
water pollution by regulating and monitoring those who do so by necessity or 
illegally.125 The FWPCA is not an outright ban on the pollution of the Na-
tion’s waters because it still allows for pollutants to be discharged with the 
proper permit.126 Therefore, the availability of NPDES permits demonstrates 
that there is some flexibility in achieving Congress’s policy goals.127 
A balanced and beneficial result is achieved by allowing a court to use 
its discretionary power to resolve statutory violations with broader equitable 
remedies in certain instances.128 If courts reviewed violations of the FWPCA 
mechanically and issued an injunction automatically, it would create a signifi-
cant injustice to the enjoined party and potentially to outside interests.129 In 
this case, enjoining the Navy’s operations would essentially end its use of a 
critical military training installation.130 Among the repercussions that would 
result from this action, national security served as the primary factor of the 
court’s determination because of the unique value of Vieques as a naval train-
ing ground.131 Because these exercises caused no environmental harm, the 
Court balanced the interests of both sides by supporting the District Court’s 
decision not to issue an injunction, but instead ordered the Navy to acquire a 
NPDES permit to achieve compliance with the FWPCA.132 
If the Navy’s actions caused actual environmental harm, beyond just 
noncompliance with the FWPCA, the Supreme Court’s use of a more flexible 
equitable remedy would have been inappropriate.133 In that situation, the 
Court would be facing a dispute similar to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 
because the Navy’s actions would be an actual violation of the statute and, if 
not enjoined, would directly contradict Congress’ intent to prevent the pollu-
tion of the nation’s waters.134 Thus, the Court would have no choice but to 
enjoin the Navy’s actions in order to both enforce the statute and give effect 
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to its purpose.135 Further, there would be no room for an equitable balance in 
such a situation because the environmental harm cannot be ignored due to 
Congress’ intent to prevent and control pollution.136 Additionally, any nation-
al security concerns in this situation can be handled by obtaining a permit, or 
by invoking the FWPCA’s provision allowing the President to issue a compli-
ance waiver.137 
Therefore, Weinberger’s precedential weight should be isolated to statu-
tory violations that are “technical” in nature.138 Although courts have the 
power to balance the interests of disputing parties to reach an equitable solu-
tion, they do not have the power to veto a law that is clear and constitutional, 
such as the FWPCA.139 The power to legislate is held by Congress, and an 
enacted law must be enforced so that its purpose is upheld.140 Allowing an 
equitable balance for actual violations of a statute would effectively enable 
courts to choose when to enforce the law based on the circumstances of each 
dispute.141 To grant courts such broad power would effectively make courts, 
and not Congress, the final arbiters of legislative intent and such a scheme 
would offend the bedrock doctrine of separation of powers.142 Therefore, 
courts should remain obligated to enforce a statute when violations occur, but 
reserve the right to balance the equities in disputes involving “technical” vio-
lations of the law.143 This allows for an efficient system where actual envi-
ronmentally harmful violations are enjoined and “technical” violations are 
brought into compliance without disrupting any parties’ interests.144 
CONCLUSION 
Since its acquisition of large portions of Vieques, the United States Navy 
(“Navy”) has used the land for strategic training exercises. The Navy heavily 
relies on this training installation, which is part of a wider military complex 
known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Range. The training exercises 
involved the use of ordnance, resulting in the accidental and intentional 
bombing of the waters surrounding the area. The Federal Water Pollution 
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Control Act (“FWPCA”), which Congress passed to prevent and control wa-
ter pollution, indicates that the discharging of munitions is a violation of the 
statute. Without a permit, the Navy failed to comply with the FWPCA. Its 
actions, however, caused no environmental harm, making the Navy’s acts a 
“technical” violation. 
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling is proper because it serves 
both parties’ interests. The Court also expressed heavy support for a court of 
equity’s discretionary powers to reach a balanced resolution. Although this 
may undermine the enforcement power of the FWPCA, it allows for “tech-
nical” violations to be adjudicated and brought into compliance without inter-
fering with a party’s activities. In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the statute 
was violated, but the law’s purpose was not undermined because there was a 
lack of actual environmental harm. A court’s discretionary use of their equita-
ble powers needs to be limited to these situations. If not, the holding of Wein-
berger could be interpreted as giving all courts hearing statute violations the 
ability to choose when to enforce the law. This cannot be allowed, as a court 
cannot disregard a valid law and its purpose or serve as a legislature. Overall, 
allowing for equitable resolutions to “technical” violations creates efficiency 
and logical results. 
